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Transparency	and	surveillance:	assessing	the	approach	of	the	
Investigatory	Powers	Tribunal	in	Liberty	&	Others	
Maria Helen Murphy 
Introduction	
A recent pair of Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) rulings—involving privacy advocates, 
the Intelligence Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), and the Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)— raises pressing questions about the importance of 
transparency in the surveillance context.1 Through Edward Snowden’s exposure of the covert 
activities of intelligence agencies, unwanted transparency was imposed on many of the world’s 
most powerful governments. In fact, the original basis for the complaints ruled on by the IPT 
arose from documents made public as a direct result of the Snowden revelations. A tension 
exists between the reality that full transparency of intelligence activities could hinder the 
effectiveness of such operations and the principle that transparency is essential if citizens are 
to hold their government to account accurately.2 This article examines the struggle between 
these competing ideas and considers how the IPT resolved the tension. In conclusion, this 
article speculates on how the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) might resolve the 
conflict differently and suggests the adoption of an evolved approach that values transparency 
but does not rely on it as a panacea.  
From the decision not to admit the existence of MI6 until 1994,3 to the governance of the 
intelligence services through informal non-statutory mechanisms for many years,4 the United 
Kingdom intelligence services have historically fostered a strong culture of secrecy. This 
legacy of opacity has significantly lessened in recent decades as British society has witnessed 
the gradual opening up of covert intelligence activities to public scrutiny.5 The key incentive 
for such reform, however, has not been recognition of the benefits of transparency in a 
democratic society, but a desire to avoid legal challenge.6 The threat of legal challenge arose 
primarily from obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).7 
Of course, the UK intelligence agencies are not alone in seeking to shield their activities from 
scrutiny and this can be defended in certain circumstances. There is clearly a legitimate interest 
in protecting the operational methods of intelligence agencies from complete transparency. An 
obvious case for reduced transparency occurs in the surveillance context, where the 
effectiveness of investigations would be reduced if targets had enough information to 
consistently evade surveillance. In the seminal case of Malone, the ECtHR displayed an 
appreciation of the importance of secrecy in the context of surveillance activities by stating 
                                                             
1 Liberty, Privacy International, American Civil Liberties Union, Amnesty International, and Bytes For All v The 
Government Communications Headquarters, the Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
and the Security Service [2014] UKIPTrib 13_77-H; Liberty & Others v The Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs & Others [2015] UKIPTrib 13_77-H.  
2 Albert Meijer, “Understanding modern transparency” (2009) 75(2) Int'l Rev.Admin.Sci. 255. 
3 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (London: Cavendish, 2002), p.649. 
4 See fn.3, p.649. In 1987, Anthony Duff persuaded the Home Secretary at the time, Douglas Hurd, that “the time 
had passed when the Security Service could successfully operate on the basis that it did not exist” as the pretence 
had worn “threadbare”. Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: 
Penguin, 2010), p.766. 
5 Benjamin Goold, “Liberty and others v The United Kingdom: a new chance for another missed opportunity” 
[2009] P.L. 5, 5. 
6 See fn.5 and fn.3, p.650. 
7 Mike Maguire, Timothy John, “Covert and deceptive policing in England and Wales: Issues in regulation and 
practice” (1996) 4 Eur. J. Crime Cr. L. Cr. J. 316, 317. 
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 “the requirement of foreseeability cannot mean that an individual should be enabled to 
foresee when the authorities are likely to intercept his communications so that he can 
adapt his conduct accordingly”.8  
Crucially, however, the ECtHR went on to state that the law governing surveillance activities 
must indicate the scope of the discretion allowed to the authorities and the manner of its 
exercise with “sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, 
to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference”. 9  The ECtHR 
concluded that the UK law governing interception did not meet this standard.10 The decision in 
Malone was a key catalyst for increased transparency of UK surveillance procedures and was 
a direct influence on the development of the Interception of Communications Act 1985.11 
While the Interception of Communications Act 1985 has been criticised for constituting an 
unsatisfactory approach to compliance in response to the judgment in Malone, 12  it was 
significant as the first attempt to provide a statutory framework for the interception of 
communications.13 Similarly, it has been argued that the provision of a legal basis for the use 
of surveillance devices by police in Part III of the Police Act 1997 was only introduced when 
it was clear that the UK would lose a ECtHR case challenging the use of such devices.14 The 
introduction of comprehensive surveillance legislation, in the form of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), has been represented as another example of the UK 
government increasing the transparency of its surveillance operations in response to the 
demands of Convention compliance.15 
Another relevant reform to the activities of intelligence agencies was the creation of the IPT, 
which was established by s. 65 of RIPA. The IPT is “the only appropriate tribunal” for the 
purposes of s. 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 in relation to any proceedings against the 
intelligence services relating to actions incompatible with the ECHR.16 Accordingly, the IPT 
is the only tribunal where the surveillance activities of the intelligence agencies can be 
challenged on ECHR grounds. Unsurprisingly, the IPT was not established to open the 
activities of the intelligence agencies to full scrutiny, the imperative of secrecy was 
deemed too great. While the provision of a tribunal providing some accountability and 
access to remedies for surveillance targets is a positive feature of the UK system, an 
inherent flaw in its effectiveness has been the fact that investigative authorities have no 
obligation to notify individuals who have been subjected to surveillance. 
The	two	recent	rulings	of	the	IPT	
The background to these rulings is now well-known. While former intelligence insiders had 
made similar claims before the Snowden leaks, the publication of official documents provided 
an inescapable tangibility that captured the public imagination, removed the option of plausible 
deniability from the surveillance agencies, and put the issue of privacy firmly back on the 
                                                             
8 Malone v UK [1984] E.C.H.R. 10 at 67. 
9 See fn.8 at 68. 
10 See fn.8 at 79. 
11 See fn.13 below, 69; see fn.46 below, Ch.3. 
12 See fn.7, 321; Bethan Loftus, Benjamin Goold and Shane Macgiollabhui, “Covert policing and the Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000” (2010) 8 Arch. Rev. 5.  
13 Nick Taylor, “State surveillance and the right to privacy” (2002) 1(1) Surveill. Soc. 66, 69. 
14 Khan v UK (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 1016. Legislation regulated telephone tapping following Malone, but bugging 
remained regulated by Home Office Guidelines. See fn.13, 70; Keir Starmer, Michelle Strange and Quincy 
Whitaker, Criminal Justice, Police Powers and Human Rights (London: Blackstone, 2001), p.36.  
15 Jack Straw claimed that RIPA was “a significant step forward for the protection of human rights in this country” 
Hansard, HC vol.345, col.767) (March 6, 2000). See fn.13, 72.  
16 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 s.65. 
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global agenda. The UK and its intelligence agencies were the subject of a significant number 
of documents disclosed in the Snowden leaks. In fact, Snowden himself has commented that 
mass surveillance is “not just a US problem ... the UK has a huge dog in this fight”.17 Snowden 
has gone so far as to claim that GCHQ “are worse than the US”.18 Human Rights groups—
including Liberty and Privacy International—seized the opportunity provided by the Snowden 
leaks in order to challenge the activities of the UK intelligence agencies. The specific activities 
challenged in the two recent IPT rulings concern the arrangement that provided for UK 
intelligence agency access to US surveillance materials gathered through the operation of the 
controversial “PRISM” and “Upstream” surveillance programmes. While some aspects of the 
initial media reports concerning these programmes have been criticised,19  a report by the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) provides a credible insight into what 
these systems entailed.20  According to the PCLOB, US intelligence agencies sent written 
directives to electronic communication service providers that had been served with s. 70221 
directives requiring their assistance.22  
The PRISM system involves the government sending selectors (such as email addresses) to 
electronic communication service providers based in the US (including Facebook and 
Microsoft) and compelling the service provider to supply the government with all 
communications sent to or from that selector.23 Upstream collection occurs by compelling 
those who control major communications cables and switches to share communications which 
are deemed likely to contain foreign communications. This led to the acquisition of millions of 
communications, including emails and social media posts, which were then filtered through the 
use of selectors. While both PRISM and upstream collection have been criticised in the US, for 
the purposes of this article, the arrangement permitting UK access to these communications is 
the most pertinent issue.  
The arrangement that governed this information sharing between US and UK intelligence 
agencies was secret prior to the Snowden revelations. Further details of the arrangement were 
revealed in the course of the IPT proceedings. According to disclosures made by the 
respondents on foot of the complaint, UK intelligence agencies may request access to 
communications intercepted by foreign allies without the use of any international mutual legal 
assistance agreement in two circumstances. 24  It was disclosed that they may obtain the 
communications if an interception warrant has been issued under the RIPA, the assistance of 
the foreign government is necessary to obtain the communications, and it is necessary and 
proportionate to do so.25 The IPT proceedings also revealed that the intelligence services may 
obtain the communications without a RIPA interception warrant if the obtaining would not 
                                                             
17 Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins, Nick Davies and James Ball, “GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables 
for secret access to world’s communications” (June 21, 2013) The Guardian, 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa. 
18 See fn.17. 
19  Joe Svetlik, “Doubts cast on US govt Prism snooping program” (June 8, 2013) CNET, 
http://www.cnet.com/uk/news/doubts-cast-on-us-govt-prism-snooping-program/. 
20 See fn.22 below. While factually authoritative, its analysis has been challenged. Mike Masnick, “Privacy And 
Civil Liberties Board mostly unconcerned about PRISM or backbone tapping by NSA” (July 2, 2014) Tech Dirt, 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140702/06315727755/privacy-civil-liberties-board-mostly-unconcerned-
about-prism-backbone-tapping-nsa.shtml .   
21 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (1978) as amended s.702. 
22 Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), Report on the surveillance program operated pursuant 
to section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (2014), p.7. 
23 See fn.22. 
24 Liberty & Others [2014] UKIPTrib 13_77-H at 47. 
25 See fn.24.  
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amount to a “deliberate circumvention of RIPA” 26  and the obtaining was necessary and 
proportionate.27  
Due to the secret nature of both the information sharing arrangement and the PRISM and 
Upstream programmes, it is unsurprising that UK human rights groups launched a legal 
challenge following the Snowden revelations. The basic complaint made to the IPT was that 
the secret arrangement between GCHQ and the National Security Agency violated Articles 8 
and 10 ECHR. While freedom of expression has clear ancillary relevance to the claim, the 
focus of both rulings was on whether Article 8 had been violated. While Article 8 guarantees a 
right to respect for private life, that right is limited in circumstances where the limitation is “in 
accordance with the law”, “for a legitimate aim”, and “necessary in a democratic society”. The 
focal point of both the December 2014 and February 2015 rulings was whether the information 
sharing arrangement between the US and UK intelligence agencies was “in accordance with 
the law”. The focus on the “in accordance with the law” aspect of the inquiry, at the expense 
of the “necessary in a democratic society” question, is unsurprising in light of the tendency of 
the ECtHR to adopt a similar approach when dealing with surveillance cases.28 
When determining whether an interference with Article 8 was “in accordance with the law”, 
the ECtHR examines whether the intrusive measures have a basis in domestic law29 and 
whether the law was adequately accessible and foreseeable.30 These requirements are logical 
protections as when actions are obscured from public scrutiny, there is an increased risk of 
arbitrariness. 31  In the December 2014 and February 2015 rulings, the IPT reflected this 
approach, and stated that in order for an interference with Article 8 to be deemed “in accordance 
with the law”, the  
“law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent 
authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give the individual 
adequate protection against arbitrary interference.”32  
The IPT placed significant emphasis on the importance of foreseeability of surveillance 
measures and stated that “sufficient signposting of the rules or arrangements” is required. The 
key finding of the December ruling was that the arrangement that allowed UK intelligence 
agencies access to surveillance information garnered from the US PRISM and Upstream 
programmes was compliant with the ECHR. The IPT acknowledged, however, that where such 
arrangements are secret, they will not be sufficiently accessible to the public. As accessibility 
and foreseeability are both key requirements of the ECHR, the formerly secret nature of the 
US–UK arrangement was inherently problematic. An interesting aspect of the ruling was the 
finding by the IPT that an adequate indication of the arrangement had been provided by virtue 
of information released following the commencement of the legal action. This “signposting” 
was primarily comprised of a summary of the sharing arrangement as reported in the public 
rulings of the IPT. The inference of this finding is that the “in accordance with the law” 
deficiencies of the surveillance arrangement were remedied by the transparency effectively 
imposed on the agencies through the pursuit of legal redress. 
                                                             
26 Or otherwise contravene the Padfield principle, e.g. where obtaining the communications under RIPA would 
not be technically feasible. 
27 See fn.24. According to the respondents, in the second circumstance, the Secretary of State would have to 
approve the request personally. 
28 See fnn.47-48 below.  
29 See fn.8 at 79; Khan v The United Kingdom (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 1016 at 27-28.  
30 See fn.8 at 67; Valenzuela Contreras v Spain (1999) 28 E.H.R.R. 483 at 46; Ekimdzhiev v Bulgaria [2007] 
E.C.H.R. 533 at 71.  
31 See fn.8 at 67; Klass (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 214 at 42-49; Ekimdzhiev [2007] E.C.H.R. 533 at 71. 
32 See fn.24 at 37; See fn.34 below at 15. Both rulings citing Bykov v Russia [2009] E.C.H.R. 441 at 76-78. 
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This would appear to be a cruel twist of fate for the privacy advocates and non-governmental 
organisations who had made the complaint to the IPT, on foot of the Snowden revelations, and 
had resultantly forced the intelligence agencies to reveal the arrangement to the IPT. It would 
certainly seem to be unsatisfying for this forced disclosure to now enable the intelligence 
agencies to assert the human rights compliance of their surveillance activities. The incongruity 
of this finding was mitigated somewhat by a nuance in the December ruling which saw the IPT 
question whether a finding of compliance would have been possible without the benefit of 
disclosures unwillingly made by the intelligence agencies.33 In line with this, the Order to the 
December judgment directed the parties to serve written submissions with a view to resolving  
“[w]hether by virtue of the fact that any of the matters now disclosed in the judgment 
of 5 December 2014 were not previously disclosed, there had prior thereto been a 
contravention of Articles 8 or 10 ECHR.”34  
Put simply, the IPT wished to address whether the surveillance arrangement had been in 
violation of the ECHR prior to the December ruling. 
Following due consideration of the submissions, the IPT ruled in February that prior to the 
disclosures made and referred to in the IPT’s December 2014 and February 2015 rulings, 
“Prism and/or Upstream arrangements contravened Articles 8 or 10 ECHR, but now comply”.35  
While this holding was a valuable concession to the complainants’ case, it was couched in a 
general finding of legality. The mixed nature of the ruling has been appropriately reflected in 
the public statements of the parties made in response. A GCHQ spokesperson played down the 
significance of the ruling and focused on the finding of legality: 
“We are pleased that the court has once again ruled that the UK’s bulk interception 
regime is fully lawful. It follows the court’s clear rejection of accusations of ‘mass 
surveillance’ in their December judgment.”36 
In a stance of defiance, the spokesperson asserted that the ruling would “not require GCHQ to 
change in any way what it does”.37 On the other hand, the February ruling was the first example 
of the IPT finding against the intelligence services in the Tribunal’s 15-year history. Clearly, 
this alone constituted a significant victory for transparency and the protection of privacy. Eric 
King, of Privacy International, expressed thanks to Edward Snowden for exposing the secret 
surveillance activities and described the decision of the IPT as a “vindication of his actions”.38 
The ruling has also been described as “a validation—if such still were needed—of the 
importance of the document releases from Snowden”.39 In spite of such endorsements, it is 
clear to all that the victory for privacy in these rulings is, at best, a partial one. The finding that 
the subsequent—non-voluntary—disclosures are deemed sufficient to bring the system into 
compliance clearly tempers the value of the result from a privacy perspective. A further effect 
of the ruling, however, is to add purpose to the pursuit of the UK intelligence agencies at the 
ECtHR. In response to the ruling, James Welch, Legal Director for Liberty, expressed 
                                                             
33 See fn.24 at 153-154; See fn.34 below. 
34 Liberty & Others [2015] UKIPTrib 13_77-H at 11. 
35 See fn.34 at 32. 
36  Owen Bowcott, “UK-US surveillance regime was unlawful ‘for seven years’” (February 6, 2015) The 
Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/feb/06/gchq-mass-internet-surveillance-unlawful-court-
nsa. 
37 See fn.36.  
38 Privacy International, “GCHQ-NSA intelligence sharing unlawful, says UK surveillance tribunal” (February 6, 
2015) privacyinternational.org, https://www.privacyinternational.org/?q=node/482. 
39 Karlin Lillington, “Ruling on data spying validates Snowden’s actions” (February 27, 2015) The Irish Times, 
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/ruling-on-data-spying-validates-snowden-s-actions-1.2100158. 
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satisfaction with the finding of a violation but stated that Liberty disagrees with the holding 
that the safeguards revealed during IPT proceedings are adequate for the protection of privacy 
and expressed resolve to pursue the issue to Strasbourg. 
Likelihood	of	success	at	the	ECtHR	
It is submitted that the contention of the complainants that the “forced disclosure of a limited 
subset of rules” governing mass surveillance is insufficient to render the activities lawful has 
merit. As the ECtHR has consistently stated, in order for intrusive surveillance measures to be 
found compatible with Article 8, the legal basis for the intrusive measures must be adequately 
accessible and foreseeable.40 The conclusion reached by the IPT that the recently publicised 
summary of the internal policies—as contained in a 77-page decision of the IPT and not 
enshrined in statute41—constituted a sufficiently detailed and public legal framework is ripe 
for challenge.  
While the ECtHR has previously held that not all government endorsed privacy intrusions 
require publication in statute, 42  such publication would clearly be desirable from the 
perspective of accessibility and foreseeability. Even assuming the ECtHR does not find 
statutory enshrinement to be necessary, there is a strong argument that the limited description 
of the arrangement, and its basis in a complex collection of various legal grounds and 
interpretations, fails to provide an  
“adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which 
public authorities are empowered to resort to this secret and potentially dangerous 
interference with the right to respect for private life”.43   
Supporters of the legal action have a long line of decisions from the ECtHR jurisprudence that 
support their focus on the “in accordance with the law” standard. Notably, the ECtHR has 
censured the UK government numerous times for failing to provide adequate accessibility and 
foreseeability of the laws governing its surveillance procedures. In the case of Liberty, the 
ECtHR ruled that in spite of the existence of “internal regulations, manuals and instructions to 
provide for procedures to protect against abuse of power” the law had not indicated with  
“sufficient clarity, so as to provide adequate protection against abuse of power, the 
scope or manner of exercise of the very wide discretion conferred on the State to 
intercept and examine external communications”.44  
Due to the prominent role that the “in accordance with the law” standard has played in the 
surveillance jurisprudence, it seems likely that the ECtHR may find against the UK on similar 
grounds yet again. If the ECtHR finds against the UK, the Court may choose to delineate the 
requirements of a surveillance sharing regime that would meet the appropriate standard of 
accessibility and foreseeability. In the past, the ECtHR has not hesitated to be prescriptive in 
this regard.45  
There are clear benefits to focusing on the “in accordance with the law” question in the 
surveillance context. Lustgarten and Leigh point out that framing laws with precision 
announces not only to the relevant authorities, “what practices are authorized, for what 
                                                             
40 See fn.30. 
41 Eric King, Carly Nyst and Caroline Wilson Palow, “The snoopers’ loophole: why winning against GCHQ is 
bittersweet” (February 10, 2015) privacyinternational.org, https://www.privacyinternational.org/?q=node/494. 
42 Kruslin v France (1990) 12 E.H.R.R. 547 at 29. 
43 See fn.8. 
44 Liberty v UK [2008] E.C.H.R. 568 at 66-69 
45 Huvig v France (1990) 12 E.H.R.R. 528 at 34; see fn.43 at 35; Valenzuela Contreras (1999) 28 E.H.R.R. 483 
at 46; Weber and Saravia v Germany [2006] E.C.H.R. 1173 at 95.  
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purposes, and within what limits” but also communicates this clearly to the public.46 Evidence 
for ECtHR support of this view is found in the surveillance context, where the ECtHR has often 
found a violation under the legality test and then chosen not to consider the question of 
necessity.47 This focus contrasts with the approach of the ECtHR in other contexts, where the 
ECtHR has often focused its scrutiny on the “necessary in a democratic society” question.48An 
advantage of assessing the surveillance regime under the “in accordance with the law” test is 
that the ECtHR can avoid thorny questions of national interest and the margin of appreciation. 
This has clear appeal in an area of such acutely sensitive national interest as focusing on 
requirements of accessibility and foreseeability inures the ECtHR from being criticised for 
making “arbitrary value judgments”.49  
It is worth reflecting on the fact, however, that while the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in 
surveillance cases has been “traditionally hailed as a powerful demonstration of the strength of 
the Convention”,50 the responses to these rulings have been criticised as minimalist.51 While 
the UK has frequently responded to European developments in privacy law with reform 
measures, Goold points out that the amendments have tended to be “uniformly backward-
looking and begrudging” with the focus on protecting surveillance powers while affecting the 
role of compliant state.52 Accordingly, while it seems likely that the civil liberties groups will 
have success in Strasbourg, there is a risk that it will be on similarly—if not quite so—narrow 
grounds as the February ruling of the IPT. The historical response of the UK to such findings 
in similar circumstances inspires scepticism regarding the privacy enhancing benefits of such 
a decision.  
Conclusion	
The civil liberties campaigners involved in the action against the UK intelligence agencies 
extol the virtues of transparency. The ECtHR approach to accessibility and foreseeability 
attempts to draw the appropriate balance between the importance of secrecy in covert 
investigations and the democratic imperative for transparency of government actions and 
powers. A clear point of contention regarding the recent rulings of the IPT was the finding that 
surveillance conducted after January 2015 was acceptable as the formerly secret rules have 
been made public through the legal proceedings. The irony of the new-found transparency 
being largely attributable to the Snowden revelations is evident. The interception sharing 
arrangement was in violation of the Convention when it was conducted in secret, but the 
exposure of the programme—and consequent summary explanation of the arrangement—
remedied the illegality and rendered the arrangement compliant. Such a finding undermines the 
                                                             
46 Laurence Lustgarten and Ian Leigh, In from the cold: National security and parliamentary democracy (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), p.46. 
47 Nicole Moreham, “The right to respect for private life in the European Convention on Human Rights: a re-
examination” [2008] E.H.R.L.R. 44, 55-56; Iain Cameron, National security and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), p.102; Rita Esen, “Intercepting communications 
‘in accordance with the law’” [2012] J. Crim. L. at 164.  
48 This is in spite of the fact that finding a breach under the first or second standard of Article 8 will often 
“obliterate the need for evaluations based on the third standard”. Pieter Van Dijk, Fried van Hoof, Arjen van Rijn 
and Leo Zwaak, Theory and practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Antwerp: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2006), p.334-335. Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The margin of appreciation doctrine and the principle of 
proportionality in the jurisprudence of ECHR (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2002), p.62; Stefan Sottiaux, Terrorism and 
the limitation of rights (Oxford: Hart, 2008), p.276. 
49  Aileen McHarg, “Reconciling human rights and the public interest: conceptual problems and doctrinal 
uncertainty in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights” (1999) 62(5) M.L.R. 671 at 671. 
50 Antoine Hol and John Vervaele, Security and civil liberties: the case of terrorism (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2005), 
pp.45-46. 
51 See Fn.5, 5-6. 
52 See Fn.5, 5-6. 
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promise of transparency as a tool of government control. While transparency is necessary, it is 
certainly not the solution. Where transparency reveals activities with serious implications for 
the private life of citizens, it is imperative that the proportionality and reasonableness of such 
programmes are given full consideration. Without such assessment, a requirement of 
transparency becomes a minor hurdle for the government to overcome and provides a veneer 
of legitimacy to what may be excessive and undemocratic programmes.  
The case of Marper offers an alternative roadmap for the ECtHR to follow when it considers 
the Convention compliance of the US–UK arrangement. In Marper, the ECtHR could have 
found the DNA Database system to be in breach of the ECHR on legality grounds as “[a]ll the 
significant detail about operation of the DNA and fingerprint database … was contained in 
non-statutory internal guidance”.53 Instead, however, the ECtHR chose to focus on questions 
of reasonableness and concluded that the DNA Database regime constituted “a disproportionate 
interference with the applicants’ right to respect for private life and cannot be regarded as 
necessary in a democratic society”.54 While the application of the “in accordance with the law” 
test has clear benefits in such sensitive areas of government policy, its consideration should not 
be at the expense of the necessity test. Where review is limited to whether an adequate legal 
basis is provided, the political questions are ignored and the review strays dangerously close to 
tokenism.55 After all, the UK government could, yet again, respond to such a finding with a 
minimalist law and continue or even increase its current activities. In line with this reasoning, 
the ECtHR should reject the easy option and embrace a full consideration of the proportionality 
of the information sharing arrangement.  
 
                                                             
53 Gordon Nardell, “Levelling up: data privacy and the European Court of Human Rights” in Serge Gutwirth, 
Yves Poullet and Paul de Hert (eds), Data Protection in a Profiled World (Amsterdam: Springer, 2010). 
54 S and Marper v UK [2008] E.C.H.R. 1581 at 125. 
55 In spite of this risk, the cases of Iordachi and Ekimdzhiev provide useful demonstrations of the “in accordance 
with the law requirement” being applied in a more effective manner. In addition to assessing the sufficiency of 
the legislative safeguards in place, the ECtHR also evaluated the effectiveness of the regimes in practice by 
examining the number of warrants issued. According to the ECtHR in Ekimdzhiev, the numbers indicated that 
the system of secret surveillance was “to say the least, overused, which may in part be due to the inadequate 
safeguards which the law provides”. Ekimdzhiev [2007] E.C.H.R. 533 at 92 and Iordachi v Moldova [2009] 
E.C.H.R. 256 at 52. 
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